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Introduction
Psychoanalytic Hostility to Politics

The Politics of a Nonpolitical Theory
Psychoanalysis begins with individual subjects and their suffering. By
allowing subjects to speak freely in the analytic session and by offering an
interpretative intervention in this speech, psychoanalysis aims to reduce
the impairment that their psychic disorder creates in their lives. In contrast
to Marxism, which also attempts to ameliorate human suffering, psychoanalysis has no explicit political program designed to lessen the misery that
Freud and his descendants find in their patients. There is no revolt of the
patients that would correspond to the revolt of the proletariat. When Freud
makes political pronouncements, they tend to be negative ones, expressing
his skepticism about plans for social betterment. But it is my contention
that a viable political project does inhere within psychoanalytic theory
and that this project provides an avenue for emancipatory politics after the
end of Marxism in the twentieth century. There are points at which this
psychoanalytic politics remains proximate to Marxism, but it represents a
genuine alternative that has the virtue of explaining the latter’s failures. The
task of this book will be to lay out the contours of this political project, one
that has never been fully developed despite numerous attempts at bringing
psychoanalytic thinking to bear on politics.
Unlike most previous formulations of a psychoanalytic politics, what
follows will take as its point of departure not the early Freud of the sexual
drive but the later Freud of the death drive (and its development in the
thought of Jacques Lacan and his followers). I will conspicuously ignore
all psychoanalytic thinking that deviates from Freud and from his specific
1
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rendering of the death drive. This means that psychoanalytic luminaries
such as Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, Wilfred
Bion, and even Freud’s own daughter Anna Freud will have no role to play
in this account of the psychoanalytic political project.
The death drive has historically acted as a stumbling block for psychoanalytic politics because it involves our self-sabotage. It leads us to work
unconsciously against social betterment. This is why, after its discovery in
1920, Freud becomes so much more pessimistic as a thinker. But just as the
death drive leads to self-sabotage, it also acts as the source of our enjoyment,
and by shifting the terrain of emancipatory politics to that of enjoyment,
psychoanalysis offers what Marxism’s political program could not. The
politics of psychoanalysis after Marxism is an emancipatory project based
on the self-sacrificing enjoyment located in the death drive. Marxism is
able to theorize sacrifice as necessary for future pleasure, but it is unable
to conceive sacrifice as an end in itself, as a source of enjoyment.1 This
represents its fundamental limitation.
The efforts to marry psychoanalysis and a political program since Freud’s
discovery of the unconscious have come from both sides of the aisle. Marxist thinkers such as Theodor Adorno and Louis Althusser have turned to
psychoanalysis in order to supplement Marxism with a mode of thought
that would address the complexities of subjectivity, while psychoanalytic
thinkers such as Erich Fromm and Wilhelm Reich have turned to Marxism
as a way of giving a sociohistorical importance to their understanding of
the suffering that they discovered in psychoanalytic practice. Today this
intersection animates the thought of many of the most compelling voices
in contemporary political thought: Alain Badiou, Étienne Balibar, Ernesto
Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière, and Slavoj Žižek, to name just
a few.
But the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and politics has
never freed itself of the fundamental divergence that animates it. Something
about psychoanalytic thought inherently resists appropriation by a program
aimed at the common good. Rather than helping with such a program,
it almost inevitably testifies to the reasons for its failure. The attempt to
give political relevance to the insights of psychoanalysis seems a hopeless
one, and yet this is precisely the aim of this book. Without minimizing the
psychoanalytic critique of progress and the common good, it lays out the
2
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contours of a political theory and practice derived from psychoanalytic
thought. In doing so, it challenges the very history of psychoanalysis itself.
While Freud expresses sympathy with the Russian Revolution and contends that it seemed “like the message of a better future,” he continually
emphasizes the intractable barriers that any project of emancipatory politics
would encounter.2 About the Soviet Union in particular, he speculatively
grasps the incipient horrors of Stalinism at a time when no one in the West
had any direct knowledge of them (and the worst had yet to occur). In
Civilization and Its Discontents he notes, “One only wonders, with concern,
what the Soviets will do after they’ve wiped out their bourgeois.”3 This is a
psychoanalytic insight into the nature of the emancipatory political project that pursues the good society. For Freud, the Soviet attempt to create
a better future not only chases an impossible goal, but it also exacerbates
existing human suffering. It is not simply Freud’s personal judgment or
prejudice that renders this verdict and installs an incompatibility between
psychoanalytic thought and progressive political programs; this incompatibility inheres within the very psychoanalytic approach to the world.
On the face of it, this claim appears counterintuitive: one can imagine,
for instance, a psychoanalytic understanding of the nature of desire aiding
political theorists in their attempts to free desire from ideology, which is
the recurring difficulty of leftist politics. There are even historical examples
of this theoretical assistance at work. Louis Althusser develops his theory
of ideological interpellation through his acquaintance with Jacques Lacan’s
conception of the subject’s entrance into language, and Juliet Mitchell elaborates her critique of the structural effects of patriarchy through her experience with Freudian conceptions of masculinity and femininity. In each
case, psychoanalysis allows the theorist to understand how a prevailing
social structure operates, and this provides a foundation for imagining a
way to challenge this structure. As Mitchell claims, “Psychoanalysis is not
a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. If we are
interested in understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we
cannot afford to neglect it.”4 Precisely because she sees psychoanalysis as a
useful tool for political struggle, Mitchell here dismisses feminism’s longstanding quarrel with psychoanalysis for its complicity with patriarchy.5
Underlying a position like Mitchell’s (which almost all political theorists
who turn to psychoanalysis embrace) is the idea that the political usefulness
3
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of psychoanalysis stems, ironically, from its lack of a political commitment.
That is to say, psychoanalysis aims to discover the unconscious truth of the
subject and the society in which the subject exists, not to change this truth.
It is thus at the most basic level a descriptive rather than a prescriptive art.
Even the psychoanalytic cure itself does not portend radical change for
the subject who accomplishes it. This subject simply recognizes, in Jacques
Lacan’s words, “I am that.” The cure is more a recognition of who one is
rather than a transformation of one’s subjectivity. Though psychoanalysis
does view this recognition as the most radical kind of revolution, the revolution changes how the subject relates to its activity, not the activity itself. In
this sense, psychoanalysis has no political axe to grind, which allows it to
devote its energies to the project of interpretation and understanding. The
understanding it produces can then form the basis for the different sorts of
leftist political contestation that may appropriate it.
The problem with this appropriation is the point at which it arrests the
descriptive process of psychoanalytic interpretation. Psychoanalysis does not
merely describe the structure of one culture or socioeconomic formation
(such as patriarchy or capitalism); it instead insists on a fundamental validity
across cultural and socioeconomic boundaries. It also insists on this validity
across different historical epochs. It is, in short, a universal theory concerning the relationship between the individual subject and society.6 Of course,
Freud discovered psychoanalysis in a particular historical situation that
shaped how he presented his insights and even the ideas he could formulate.
But one can separate the particular elements (like the Oedipus complex or
the labeling of homosexuality as a perversion) from the universal ones (like
the antagonistic nature of society or the fact of castration as the requirement
for entrance into society). The challenge for the psychoanalytic theorist is
discovering the universality in Freud’s discoveries, but it is this universality
that presents an obstacle for any political project. If the antagonism between
the subject and the social order is irreducible, then the stumbling block is
not just capitalism or patriarchy but human society itself.
The insights of psychoanalysis, if valid at all, apply not simply to the
past and the present but also to whatever future society we might envision
or even realize. Though Freud developed the insights of psychoanalysis
in a particular historical situation, this situation enabled him to discover
universal structures of subjectivity and of the social order, even if his way
4
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of conceptualizing these structures initially reflected the constraints of his
historical situation. The insights apply not only to contemporary patriarchal
society but also, pace Juliet Mitchell, to the future society that frees itself
from patriarchy. This is not to say that we will always have the same forms
of neurosis and psychosis that we have now but that we will not surmount
the fundamental antagonism between the social order and the individual
subject that produces these specific disorders. As a result, for psychoanalysis
the good society becomes an unattainable fiction.
You’re No Good
The great challenge that psychoanalysis poses for emancipatory politics — and
for politics as such — is its absolute rejection of the good or the good society.
In the opening of the Politics, Aristotle describes the good as the basic aim
of political activity, and this aim has remained constant in the intervening
2,500 years.7 Aristotle never attempts to prove this constitutive remark in his
treatise but simply takes it as an unassailable postulate of political thinking.
For subsequent political thinkers, the question does not concern Aristotle’s
claim about the good but in what the good consists. There is unanimity
about the political pursuit of the good not just among political theorists
but among almost everyone who thinks about politics at all.
From the perspective of psychoanalysis, however, there is no good at
all. The good society is unattainable not just as a result of the competing
desires of the individuals within the society. The theory that aligns social
conflict with the coexistence of competing individual desires fails to go far
enough in envisioning the antagonistic nature of the social order. No matter
how divergent individual desires are, one could always imagine reconciling
them with each other through some sort of compromise. A thinker such as
John Rawls can imagine a just society despite positing a society divided by
innumerable competing desires on the level of the individual. Justice here
would consist in the idea of fairness — using one’s imagination to envision
society through what Rawls labels a “veil of ignorance” that allows one to
make decisions about justice without taking into account one’s individual
interests or desires or social position.8 This would facilitate a good society in
which any inequality would be socially justified, and it would thus reconcile
competing individual desires with each other.
5
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But the barrier to the good society runs deeper than this. It derives from
the very idea of the good, which Freud sees as fundamentally at odds with
itself. The good itself, not our failures to achieve it, is the problem. This is
the fundamental political insight that psychoanalysis brings to the table. It is
at once the challenge that it poses to emancipatory politics and the basis for
its implicit project for emancipation. As we get closer to the ideal of a good
society, we simultaneously approach the emptiness concealed within the
ideal. The notion of the good does not emerge simply from moral reasoning and speculation about the proper arrangement of society. We develop
this notion only through the experience of its prohibition. That is to say,
the prohibition of the good doesn’t form an obstacle to a preexisting ideal
but constitutes the ideal as such.
The good has no existence outside of the barriers that we erect around
realizing it. As Jacques Lacan points out in one of his most important political
statements, “The step taken by Freud at the level of the pleasure principle
is to show us that there is no Sovereign Good — that the Sovereign Good,
which is das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden good, and that there is no other good. Such is the foundation of the
moral law as turned on its head by Freud.”9 The foundational link between
the good and prohibition renders its pursuit completely contradictory.
Every step toward the good occasions a corresponding step away from it.
The closer we come, the more we undermine the social stability that we
hoped to achieve. This occurs not just among the many utopian socialist
projects that have failed but across all types of social structures.
For psychoanalysis, the good is not just an unrealizable ideal but a deception incapable of orienting a coherent and sustainable politics. This critique
threatens to undermine the very idea of a political project because political
theorists write in order to help bring about change, which means moving
society in the direction of the good (even if they admit that the ideal itself
is not realizable). Conservative theorists seem immune to this critique, but
they envision a return to the good or the creation of a social stability that
they associate implicitly with the good.10 Political theorists of all stripes
write to change the world and assist its progression (or its return to a better state), whereas psychoanalysis interprets the world and uncovers the
repetition at work where it seems to be progressing.
For this reason, Julia Kristeva theorizes the political project inherent in
6
Buy the Book

Introduction

psychoanalysis as one of permanent revolt. Rather than forming a positive
program, psychoanalysis, like modernist literature, exists simply as a negation of identity and power. In The Sense and Non-sense of Revolt, she argues,
“psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and a certain literature, on the other,
perhaps constitute possible instances of revolt culture.”11 From Kristeva’s
point of view, psychoanalysis is completely political insofar as it demands
revolt, but this revolt can never become revolution. Psychoanalytic revolt
is destined to remain revolt against some existing power structure toward
which it will continue to provide resistance. Kristeva views psychoanalytic
thought as a hiccup in the hegemony of scientific rationality and progress.
Any attempt to create a positive psychoanalytic politics would obviate its
role as a key part of revolt culture.
Kristeva’s dismissal of positive psychoanalytic politics fails to take cognizance of the implicit positive program in every revolt. When one revolts,
one relies on and sustains the system against which one revolts. Nowhere
is this truer than within the capitalist system, in which revolt forms the
lifeblood. If psychoanalysis is nothing but revolt, it is politically vacuous.
And yet, Kristeva does correctly recognize the seemingly inherent hostility
of psychoanalysis to progressive change. Rather than aid in this process,
psychoanalysis highlights the moments of its interruption and suspension.
This position puts psychoanalysis directly at odds with Marxism’s emphasis on the centrality of praxis. Marx theorizes in order to facilitate social
change, and every political project by its very nature shares this goal with
Marxism. What distinguishes both Marx and Freud as thinkers is their
understanding of social antagonism. Where Freud sees antagonism manifesting itself in the excessive suffering of the individual subject, Marx sees
it playing out in class struggle. Despite this difference in focus, they share a
belief in the fundamental status of antagonism, which separates them from
political thinkers (such as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls) who view the
social order as whole, as divided by conflicts but not by a fundamental
antagonism. We can resolve conflicts through mediation and negotiation,
but antagonism implies the impossibility of resolution.
An antagonism doesn’t just involve two opposing positions — like that of
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat — but conceives of opposition as internal
to each position. This idea of each position being internally opposed to itself
is what liberal political thinkers cannot grant (if they wish to remain liberal
7
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political thinkers). Just as they view society as whole, they also view each
conflicting position within society as unified and identical with itself. Not
so with Marx and Freud. For Marx, the conflict between the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat is at the same time the indication of an internal conflict
within the bourgeoisie itself. In fact, the bourgeoisie produces the proletariat
out of itself through the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.
For Freud, the conflict between the individual and the social order is also
an internal conflict within the individual and within the social order.
Even societies that lack the concept of an individual must nonetheless reckon with this universal antagonism. That is, they must attempt to
reconcile the continued existence of the social order with the entrance
of new subjects into that order. Though the individual may be a Western
idea, the social antagonism resulting from the subject’s entrance into the
social order is not. The elaborate marriage rules that Claude Lévi-Strauss
uncovered in various societies attest to the problem of this antagonism
surfacing universally.12 The individual emerges as a distinct being because
the social order cannot reproduce itself without producing a remainder,
even if this remainder doesn’t take the form of the individual that is familiar
to the Western world.
The idea of antagonism allows Marx and Freud to author their radical
social critiques. It allows them to see how the proletariat or the individual
invests itself in its own oppression, or how the bourgeoisie or the social
order contributes to its own subversion. Antagonism is both the cause of
social stasis and the possibility for revolutionary change. For Marx and
Freud, interpretation must take antagonism as its point of departure, though
Marx sees, in the last instance, the possibility of overcoming antagonism
through the victory of the proletariat and the consequent elimination of
class struggle.
Marx envisioned a society in which production would take place for the
good of the society rather than for the sake of the accumulation of capital,
a change that would allow production to develop without limit. Within the
capitalist mode of production, according to Marx,
the true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital
and its self-valorization appear as the starting and finishing point as the
motive and purpose of production; production is production only for
8
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capital, and not the reverse, i.e. the means of production are not simply
means for a steadily expanding pattern of life for the society of the producers. . . . The means — the unrestricted development of the social forces
of production — comes into persistent conflict with the restricted end,
the valorization of the existing capital. If the capitalist mode of production is therefore a historical means for developing the material powers
of production and for creating a corresponding world market, it is at the
same time the constant contradiction between this historical task and
the social relations of production corresponding to it.13
Included in this critique of the capitalist mode of production is the idea of a
society in which the means and the end would no longer be in conflict with
each other. For Marx, “the unrestricted development of the social forces of
production” — a society without antagonism — represents a genuine historical possibility. This is a possibility that Freud rejects because he conceives
of antagonism as constitutive of the social structure itself.
Unprotected Sex
Before writing Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 1920, Freud did not yet see
antagonism in this way. Though never a utopian believing that society might
someday overcome the need for repression altogether, early in the development of psychoanalysis he does argue against the excesses of contemporary
moral restrictions on sexual activity. While he prefaces his statement by
admitting that “it is certainly not a physician’s business to come forward with
proposals for reform,” he nonetheless claims that “it seemed to me that I
might support the urgency of such proposals if I were to amplify [Christian]
Von Ehrenfel’s description of the injurious effects of our ‘civilized’ sexual
morality by pointing to the important bearing of that morality upon the
spread of modern nervous illness.”14 Freud made this claim in 1908, when
his focus remained almost wholly on the sexual drives. At this time he saw
a conflict between these drives and the interests of the ego because “the
‘ego’ feels threatened by the claims of the sexual instincts and fends them
off by repressions.”15 Though no one can definitively overcome this conflict,
Freud saw it as ameliorable, which allowed him to support a program for
the reform of restrictions on sexual activity. We can lessen the bite that the
9
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ego takes out of the sexual drives on a societal level and thereby improve
the relative satisfaction of subjects living within society.
When Freud discovered the death drive in 1920, this optimism became
theoretically untenable and disappeared from Freud’s writings. While Freud’s
discovery of the unconscious disrupted the thought of others, the discovery
of the death drive disrupted his own and that of his followers — and this
disruption makes itself felt in the halting and backtracking style of Beyond
the Pleasure Principle. Though he continues to posit sexual drives and thus
retains his psychic dualism (albeit in a completely modified form), Freud
comes to see the death drive or the compulsion to repeat as the predominant
force within the psyche and within society at large. He believes that it is
more powerful than the sexual drives, just as before he saw the sexual drives
as having more power than the drives associated with the ego. Despite this
continued dualism, the discovery of the death drive radically alters Freud’s
ability to accept the possibility of reform or progressive political change of
any sort.
When the sexual drives remained at the basis of Freudian thought, positive change existed as a possibility because dissatisfaction was not inherent within the sexual drives themselves. Psychic illness such as neurosis
developed through a conflict between the sexual drives and other forces
aligned with the ego (which also embodied the restrictive morality imposed
on the subject by society). Even if we could not completely free the sexual
drives from the repression associated with the ego, we could nonetheless
lighten the burden and establish a degree of freedom. Seen in this way, we
can imagine a Freudian politics of sexual liberation. This is the project of
leftist psychoanalytic thinkers such as Otto Gross, Wilhelm Reich, and
Erich Fromm, each of whom attacks repressive society and focuses on
sexual liberation.
For these theorists, the early Freud before the discovery of the death
drive is the more politically viable Freud. Gross, Reich, and Fromm develop
disparate theoretical perspectives, but Reich and Fromm — Gross died in
1920, though he undoubtedly would have adopted their opposition as well
had he lived — see the concept of the death drive as an unfortunate deviation on Freud’s part. Each tries to marry psychoanalysis with some form of
Marxist or socialist thought, and by doing so, they take up Marx’s belief that
society can overcome antagonism, that sexual liberation is possible within
10
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the social order. Repression, for these psychoanalytic thinkers, is not the
necessary cost of social life but a fact of what Reich calls authoritarian rule.
Even before Freud comes up with the death drive, he insists that the
sexual drive does not function smoothly but rather is constantly at odds
with itself. His self-proclaimed dualistic conception of the drives — first the
sex drive and the self-preservative drive, then the life drive and the death
drive — is actually a dialectical conception in which a single drive produces
an antagonistic struggle. The psychoanalytic leftists do not see things this
way. From their perspective, the sexual drive doesn’t run aground on its
own but hits an opposing force — social restriction. As a result, the political
project of psychoanalysis becomes perfectly clear: lift social restrictions
and allow the free play of the sexual drive.
Wilhelm Reich gives this politics its most detailed early formulation. As
both a committed Marxist and a psychoanalyst, he aligns the proletarian
revolution with sexual liberation. Reich visited the Soviet Union in 1927
and found the realization of this theoretical alignment, though he would
later attest to the Soviet retreat from sexual liberation and return to the
conservative ideology of the family. By freeing subjects from repressive
restrictions on sexuality, the social order can allow the subject’s natural
libido to flourish. The struggle, as Reich sees it, is entirely straightforward.
An authoritarian rule imposes restrictions on natural sexuality, and these
restrictions create the neurotic disorders that psychoanalysis treats. Reich
contends that Freud fails to take up a critical position relative to social
restrictions and thus blames the victims of society for the problems created
by an oppressive authoritarian structure.16
Erich Fromm takes a position similar to that of Reich, though he never
associates himself directly with the Communist revolution. Unlike Reich,
Fromm does accept a version of the death drive. He believes that a death
drive can form, but he doesn’t grant it any independent status. The death
drive, which is a drive to destroy oneself and others, emerges with the
repression of the life drive. If life successfully expresses itself, the subject will
not turn against itself and will instead develop loving relations with others
and with the self. Despite this modification of Reich, the psychoanalytic
political project is basically the same for both Reich and Fromm. Psychoanalysis takes the side of the natural libido or sexual drive and argues for its
liberation. Rather than accepting the psychoanalytic critique of the good,
11
Buy the Book

Introduction

they see a sexually liberated society as a good society that psychoanalytic
thought and therapy can help to produce.
Though Gross, Reich, and Fromm develop the political dimension of
psychoanalysis, they do so as practicing psychoanalysts. This investment in
psychoanalytic treatment restricts the extent to which they are able to construct a political theory. They are psychoanalysts first and political thinkers
second. They also collectively refuse to account for the later Freud’s turn
to the death drive, even if only to see it as a necessary obstacle with which
political struggle must contend.17 Herbert Marcuse suffers from neither
of these limitations. He is a philosopher and cultural theorist who comes
to psychoanalysis to assist in thinking through political difficulties, and
he recognizes that any political project has to incorporate the death drive.
Marcuse announces his own unique marriage of Marx and Freud in Eros and
Civilization, one of the two great attempts to construct a politics grounded
on psychoanalysis. It is a book that bears the subtitle A Philosophical Inquiry
into Freud.18
Marcuse envisions a society that would eliminate scarcity to such an
extent that it would no longer require the repression of our sexual drives,
or eros. In this type of society, the need for labor would disappear, and
the predominance of the reality principle (or the delaying of satisfaction)
could give way to an unleashing of the pleasure principle (or the direct
path to satisfaction). While Marcuse admits that up to this point in history progress has increased the amount of repression, he believes the end
of labor — and the socialist revolution necessary to accomplish it — would
occasion a dialectical reversal in which progress suddenly liberated eros
rather than augmenting its repression. This vision allows us to imagine a
world in which even death loses its traumatic dimension because individual
subjects would be reconciled with the social whole that would survive them.
In constructing his vision of a better future, Marcuse does not lose sight of
the principle that opposes eros — the death drive, or what he calls thanatos.
He views thanatos as an aggressive instinct, an instinct toward destruction
that, unlike eros, demands repression in order for society to function.19 But
there is a way to mitigate the power of this instinct for destruction: by eliminating the repression of eros, a society lessens the aggression that subjects
experience because much of this aggression arises in response to a lack of
erotic satisfaction, though this aggression would not disappear altogether.
12
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Marcuse’s ideal society appears to figure a way out of the antagonism that
Freud sees animating the relation between the individual subject and the
social order. He does so, despite borrowing terminology from the later
Freud, by focusing on the liberation of the sexual drives in the way that the
early Freud and the leftist Freudians advocate.
But such a program is constitutively incapable of admitting the idea of the
death drive with all of its theoretical force. Marcuse acknowledges the death
drive in order to show how an ideal society might minimize its power, but
the existence of the death drive sabotages the political program as such. It
leads Freud to say, toward the end of Civilization and Its Discontents, “I have
not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow
to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation.”20 The death drive
eliminates the possibility of offering consolation in the form of a traditional
political program because it erects a fundamental barrier to progress to
an extent that Marcuse cannot fully recognize due to his Marxist political
commitment.
Death at the Bottom of Everything
The death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse
to return to an inorganic state (as Freud’s metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic
and constitutive loss. The death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as
the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking
being by sacrificing a part of itself. This sacrifice is an act of creation that
produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. This loss of what the
subject doesn’t have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment
through the repetition of the initial loss.
Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifice and self-sabotage because the
loss enacted reproduces the subject’s lost object and enables the subject to
enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As
a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrificial acts that produce
the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject’s self-interest.
From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to
gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoyment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft of any satisfaction. The
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repetition of sacrifice, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which
one can enjoy oneself through the lost object.
The repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of
any particular experience. The repetition compulsion leads the subject to
repeat specifically the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed
its stable functioning. The better things are going for the subject, the more
likely that the death drive will derail the subject’s activity. According to the
theory implied by the death drive, any movement toward the good — any
progress — will tend to produce a reaction that will undermine it. This
occurs both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. In
psychoanalytic treatment, it takes the form of a negative therapeutic reaction, an effort to sustain one’s disorder in the face of the imminence of the
cure. We can also think of individuals who continue to choose romantic
relationships that fail according to a precise pattern. Politically, it means
that progress triggers the very forms of oppression that it hopes to combat
and thereby incessantly undermines itself. There is a backlash written into
every progressive program from the outset.
The death drive creates an essentially masochistic structure within the
psyche. It provides the organizing principle for the subject and orients the
subject relative to its enjoyment, and this enjoyment remains always linked
to trauma. This structure renders difficult all attempts to prompt subjects
to act in their own self-interest or for their own good. The death drive leads
subjects to act contrary to their own interests, to sabotage the projects that
would lead to their good.
Common sense tells us that sadism is easier to understand than masochism, that the sadist’s lust for power over the object makes sense in a
way that the masochist’s self-destruction does not. But for psychoanalysis,
masochism functions as the paradigmatic form of subjectivity. Considering
the structure of the death drive, masochism becomes easily explained, and
sadism becomes a mystery. Masochism provides the subject the enjoyment
of loss, while sadism seems to give this enjoyment to the other.
This is exactly the claim of Jacques Lacan’s revolutionary interpretation
of sadism in his famous article “Kant with Sade.” Though most readers focus
on the essay’s philosophical coupling of Kantian morality with Sadean
perversion, the more significant step that Lacan takes here occurs in his
explanation of sadism’s appeal. Traditionally, most people vilify sadists for
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transforming their victims into objects for their own satisfaction, but Lacan
contends that they actually turn themselves into objects for the other’s
enjoyment. He notes: “The sadist discharges the pain of existence into the
Other, but without seeing that he himself thereby turns into an ‘eternal
object.’”21 Though the other suffers pain, the other also becomes the sole
figure of enjoyment. What the sadist enjoys in the sadistic act is the enjoyment attributed to the other, and the sadistic act attempts to bring about
this enjoyment. In this sense, sadism is nothing but an inverted form of
masochism, which remains the fundamental structure of subjectivity.22
Self-destruction plays such a prominent role in human activities because
the death drive is the drive that animates us as subjects.
Unlike Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, another celebrated proponent of psychoanalytically informed political thought, attempts to construct
a psychoanalytic political project that focuses on the death drive. He does
not simply see it as the unfortunate result of the repression of eros but as a
powerful category on its own. In Life against Death Brown conceives of the
death drive as a self-annihilating impulse that emerges out of the human
incapacity to accept death and loss. As he puts it, “The death instinct is the
core of the human neurosis. It begins with the human infant’s incapacity to
accept separation from the mother, that separation which confers individual
life on all living organisms and which in all living organisms at the same time
leads to death.”23 For Brown, we pursue death and destruction, paradoxically,
because we cannot accept death. If we possessed the ability to accept our own
death, according to Brown’s view, we would avoid falling into the death drive
and would thereby rid ourselves of human violence and destructiveness.
Like Marcuse, Brown’s societal ideal involves the unleashing of the sexual
drives and the minimizing or elimination of the death drive. He even raises
the stakes, contending that unless we manage to realize this ideal, the human
species, under the sway of the death drive, will die out like the dinosaurs.
Despite making more allowances for the death drive (and for death itself)
than Marcuse, Brown nonetheless cannot avoid a similar error: the belief
that the death drive is a force that subjects can overcome. For Freud, in
contrast, it is the force that revenges itself on every overcoming, the repetition that no utopia can fully leave behind. An authentic recognition of
the death drive and its primacy would demand that we rethink the idea of
progress altogether.
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Progressing Backward
And yet some idea of progress seems essential to politics. Without progress
as a possibility, it seems obvious that one would have no reason to involve
oneself in political contestation. All political activity would become futile,
which is why few dispense with it altogether. Even a thinker such as Jacques
Derrida who struggles incessantly against the ideology of progress nonetheless implicitly retains some notion of authentic progress within his thought.
Without it, he would have no position from which to criticize the idea while
still endorsing political activity.
The problem with progress as an idea, according to someone like Derrida,
lies in the way that it places a teleology on the movement of history and
thereby prescribes a certain future that will serve to constrain our political
activity. Rather than helping to increase our freedom, the idea of progress
diminishes it by closing down the opening that the future represents. Despite
his deconstruction of progress, Derrida aligns deconstruction with hope for
a better future — with what he calls an “emancipatory promise.” In Specters of
Marx he elaborates: “Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction,
what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction
is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps
even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion,
even a messianic without messianism.”24 Though deconstruction leaves
its emancipatory promise always to be fulfilled and refuses to actualize it,
Derrida tacitly conceives the movement toward it as progressive.
The political dimension of deconstruction is founded on the belief that
a better world is possible: by deconstructing hierarchies, by insisting on a
justice to come, and by struggling against illusions of presence, we can lessen
human suffering and help to forge a more egalitarian world. There is a good,
even if fully realizing this good would transform it into its opposite (which
is Derrida’s contention). One must ensure that the good society always
remains to come, or arrivant, as Derrida puts it, but far from minimizing
the status of the good or denigrating the good, giving it a futural status in
fact elevates it and ensconces justice to come as the one idea that we cannot
deconstruct — the ultimate or sovereign good.25 Even in deconstruction,
some idea of progress as a possibility must exist in order for the theorist to
make any normative appeal whatsoever.26
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But the inescapability of the idea of progress goes still further. It is not
just the normative appeal that implies this idea; any system of thought, even
one that confines itself to pure descriptions, inevitably points toward the
possibility of progress. The act of articulating a system of thought implies
the belief that a better world is possible and that the knowledge the system
provides will assist in realizing this better world. If I didn’t believe in the
possibility of improvement, I would never bother to articulate any system
at all. The very act of enunciating even the most pessimistic system attests
to a fundamental optimism and hope for progress beyond the status quo.
This is true for an extreme pessimist like Arthur Schopenhauer as much as
it is for an avowed utopian like Charles Fourier. The position from which
one enunciates the pessimistic system is the position invested in the idea
of progress, even when the enunciated content of the system completely
denounces the idea. Though the good may be impossible to realize, it is
also impossible to abandon entirely. The production of knowledge itself
points, often despite itself, toward a better future.
This link between knowledge and progress is the controlling idea of the
Enlightenment. In his essay “What Is Enlightenment?” Kant emphasizes
that Enlightenment requires a situation where one is free to gain knowledge,
where one has “freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.”27 In
the act of gaining knowledge through reasoning, subjects facilitate progress
as they put this knowledge into use by restructuring society. Knowledge,
for Kant and for all Enlightenment thinkers, has an inherently progressive
leaning. It frees us from the tyranny of the past and from the drudgery of
repetition. Progress is only possible because we have the ability to know the
past and to learn from it.28 The Enlightenment’s belief in progress derives
from its conception of the human subject as a subject of knowledge, a
subject who fundamentally wants to know.
For psychoanalysis, the link between knowledge and progress dooms the
possibility of progress. Rather than desiring to know, the subject desires not
to know and organizes its existence around the avoidance of knowledge. In
“Le séminaire XXI” Lacan states this straightforwardly: “There has been no
desire for knowledge but . . . a horror of knowing.”29 The knowledge that we
avoid is knowledge of the unconscious because this knowledge confronts
us with the power of the death drive and the inescapability of repetition.
What we don’t know — our particular form of stupidity — allows us to move
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forward, to view the future with hopefulness. Without this fundamental
refusal to know, the subject simply could not continue.30
Freud’s great revolution in the history of thought stems from his conception of the subject as a subject of desire rather than as a subject of knowledge. Where thinkers from Plato to Kant consider an inherent striving to
know as essential to subjectivity, not only does Freud envision a different
essential drive, he contends that the subject wants not to know in order to
continue to desire. The subject acts not on the basis of what it knows but
on the basis of how it desires. We might imagine linking these two ideas of
the subject if we could link the act of knowing and the act of desiring.
But knowledge and desire are at odds: the subject doesn’t want to know
what it desires or how it enjoys. Its knowledge remains necessarily incomplete,
and the gap within knowledge is the trigger for the subject’s desire and the
point at which it enjoys. The unconscious emerges out of the subject’s incapacity for knowing its own enjoyment. Conscious knowledge is not simply
unable to arrive at the knowledge of enjoyment and its traumatic origin;
it actively functions as a barrier to this knowledge. Conscious knowledge
thwarts access to the unconscious, and, as a result, the conscious effort to
know continually defeats itself.
Psychoanalysis attempts to fill this fundamental lacuna in the project of
knowledge by demanding that the subject abandon the project in its traditional manifestation. It constructs a space that brackets conscious knowledge
in order that the subject might discover the unconscious. The fundamental
rule of psychoanalysis — one must reveal not what one knows but the words
that come to mind — aims at bringing to light what the subject doesn’t want
to know. A gap exists between what the subject knows and what it says. In
the act of speaking, the subject says more than it consciously knows, and
this excess is the unconscious — a knowledge that the subject has without
knowing it. The paradox of this knowledge is that one can access it only
when not seeking it and that once one has it, one has lost it.
Adherence to the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis insofar as it is possible allows subjects to recognize what they don’t know when it surprises
them. But it doesn’t thereby permit subjects to make progress through
the acquisition of knowledge. The recognitions that one makes in psychoanalysis do not have the status of knowledge in the traditional sense of the
term; instead, they mark an irreducible gap in the field of knowledge. One
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recognizes oneself in an unconscious desire that remains foreign, and one
takes responsibility for it despite its foreignness. By doing so, one does not
change or progress as a subject but becomes what one already was. One sees
the death drive as the truth of one’s subjectivity rather than as an obstacle
that one might try to progress beyond in order to reach the good.
Interminable Repetition
If we accept the contradictory conclusion that some idea of progress inheres
in every system of thought and that the psychoanalytic concept of the
death drive shows the impossibility of progress, this leaves psychoanalytic
thought — and especially a psychoanalytic political project — on difficult
ground. It might explain the seemingly absolute pessimism of the later
Freud, Freud after 1920, who appears to have abandoned his belief in the
efficaciousness of the psychoanalytic cure. One of his final essays, “Analysis
Terminable and Interminable,” written in 1937 (just two years before his
death), lays bare Freud’s doubts concerning our ability to break from the
power of repetition. Here, Freud conceives of subjects’ refusal to abandon
castration anxiety and penis envy as emblematic of the intractability of
repetition. He notes: “At no other point in one’s analytic work does one
suffer more from an oppressive feeling that all one’s repeated efforts have
been in vain, and from a suspicion that one has been ‘preaching to the
winds,’ than when one is trying to persuade a woman to abandon her wish
for a penis on the ground of its being unrealizable or when one is seeking
to convince a man that a passive attitude to men does not always signify
castration and that it is indispensable in many relationships in life.”31 That
is, the repetition that centers around traumatic loss acts as a barrier that
we cannot progress beyond.
In light of this barrier, the formulation of a psychoanalytically informed
political project demands that we dissociate politics from progress as it
is usually conceived. We cannot escape progress, and yet the traditional
conception of progress always runs aground. This paradox must become
the foundation of any authentic psychoanalytic politics. It demands that
rather than trying to progress toward overcoming the barrier that separates
us from the good society, we begin to view identification with the barrier as
the paradoxical aim of progress. The barrier to the good society — the social
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symptom — is at once the obstacle over which we continually stumble and
the source of our enjoyment.32
The typical politics of the good aims at a future not inhibited by a limit
that constrains the present. This future can take the form of a truly representative democracy, a socialist utopia, a society with a fair distribution
of power and wealth, or even a fascist order that would expel those who
embody the limit. But the good remains out of reach despite the various
efforts to reach it. The limit separating us from the good society is the very
thing that constitutes the good society as such. Overcoming the limit shatters the idea of the good in the act of achieving it. In place of this pursuit, a
psychoanalytic politics insists on identification with the limit rather than
attempting to move beyond or eliminate it. If there is a conception of progress in this type of politics, it is progress toward the obstacle that bars us
from the good rather than toward the good itself.
Identification with the limit involves an embrace of the repetition of the
drive because it is the obstacle or limit that is the point to which the drive
returns. No one can be the perfect subject of the drive because the drive is
what undermines all perfection. But it is nonetheless possible to change one’s
experience within it. The fundamental wager of psychoanalysis — a wager
that renders the idea of a psychoanalytic political project thinkable — is that
repetition undergoes a radical transformation when one adopts a different
attitude toward it. We may be condemned to repeat, but we aren’t condemned
to repeat the same position relative to our repetition. By embracing repetition through identification with the obstacle to progress rather than trying
to achieve the good by overcoming this obstacle, the subject or the social
order changes its very nature. Instead of being the burden that one seeks
to escape, repetition becomes the essence of one’s being and the mode
through which one attains satisfaction.
Conceiving politics in terms of the embrace of repetition rather than
the construction of a good society takes the movement that derails traditional political projects and reverses its valence. This idea of politics lacks
the hopefulness that Marxism, for instance, can provide for overcoming
antagonism and loss. With it, we lose not just a utopian ideal but the idea
of an alternative future altogether — the idea of a future no longer beset by
intransigent limits — and this idea undoubtedly mobilizes much political
energy.33 What we gain, however, is a political form that addresses the way
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that subjects structure their enjoyment. It is by abandoning the terrain of
the good and adopting the death drive as its guiding principle that emancipatory politics can pose a genuine alternative to the dominance of global
capitalism rather than incidentally creating new avenues for its expansion
and development. The death drive is the revolutionary contribution that
psychoanalysis makes to political thought. But since it is a concept relatively
foreign to political thought, I will turn to various examples from history,
literature, and film in order to concretize what Freud means by the death
drive and illustrate just what a politics of the death drive might look like.
The chapters that follow trace the implications of the death drive for
thinking about the subject as a political entity and for conceiving the political
structure of society. Part 1 focuses on the individual subject, beginning with
an explanation of how the death drive shapes this subjectivity. The various
chapters in part 1 trace the implications of the death drive for understanding how the subject enjoys, how the drive relates to social class, how the
drive impacts the subject as an ethical being, and how the subject becomes
politicized. The discussion of the impact of the death drive on the individual
subject serves as a foundation for articulating its impact on society, which
part 2 of the book addresses, beginning with the impact of the death drive
on the constitution of society. Part 2 then examines how the conception of
the death drive helps in navigating a path through today’s major political
problems: the inefficacity of consciousness raising, the seductive power of
fantasy, the growing danger of biological reductionism and fundamentalism,
the lure of religious belief, and the failure of attempts to lift repression. The
two parts of the book do not attempt to sketch a political goal to be attained
for the subject or for society but instead to recognize the structures that
already exist and silently inform both. The wager of what follows is that the
revelation of the death drive and its reach into the subject and the social
order can be the foundation for reconceiving freedom.
The recognition of the death drive as foundational for subjectivity is
what occurs with the psychoanalytic cure. Through this cure, the subject
abandons the belief in the possibility of finding a solution to the problem
of subjectivity. The loss for which one seeks restitution becomes a constitutive loss — and becomes visible as the key to one’s enjoyment rather than a
barrier to it. A political project derived from psychoanalytic thought would
work to broaden this cure by bringing it outside the clinic and enacting
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on society itself. The point is not, of course, that everyone would undergo
psychoanalysis but that psychoanalytic theory would function as a political
theory. Politically, the importance of psychoanalysis is theoretical rather
than practical. Politically, it doesn’t matter whether people undergo psychoanalytic therapy or not. This theory would inaugurate political change by
insisting not on the possibility of healing and thereby attaining the ultimate
pleasure but on the indissoluble link between our enjoyment and loss. We
become free to enjoy only when we have recognized the intractable nature
of loss.
Though psychoanalytic thought insists on our freedom to enjoy, it understands freedom in a counterintuitive way. It is through the death drive that
the subject attains its freedom. The loss that founds this drive frees the
subject from its dependence on its social environment, and the repetition
of the initial loss sustains this freedom. By embracing the inescapability
of traumatic loss, one embraces one’s freedom, and any political project
genuinely concerned with freedom must orient itself around loss. Rather
than looking to the possibility of overcoming loss, our political projects
must work to remain faithful to it and enhance our contact with it. Only
in this way does politics have the opportunity to carve out a space for the
freedom to enjoy rather than restricting it under the banner of the good.
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